Saturday, August 09, 2008

What can happen when we over work and under pay our Crowns!

Tansi/Good Day Readers:
Another great article from "Truth to Power" (http://accesstoinfo.blogspot.com) a site created by an anoymous Canadian lawyer.
According to the written decision (below), a charge against the defendant was stayed (dropped) under Section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by the judge who ruled his right to be tried within a reasonable period of time [Charter Section 11(b)] had been violated. Was this because the Crowns involved had case loads that were too heavy? Did this, in turn, result in some sloppy mistakes? Scary isn't it - could happen to any citizen. In the November 20, 2007 Speech from the Throne the government announced plan to add 20 new prosecutors.
Sincerely,
Care L. Pieuk
Jacqueline St. Hill
Director, Winnipeg Prosecutions
Rikha Malarviya
Head, Domestic Prosecutions
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Manitoba Crown Attorneys File Grievance Over 'Burnout' Conditions
Last Updated: Friday, December 1, 2006
Crown attorneys in Manitoba filed a grievance Friday with the provincial government, saying they are so overworked and understaffed that hundreds of crime victims are not getting the attention they need.
Prosecutors in Winnipeg are routinely assigned up to 300 cases at any one time, said Lisa Carson, spokeswoman for the Manitoba Association of Crown Attorneys.
In rural areas, she added, a prosecutor can face up to 700 cases.
"There's one Crown attorney who, in addition to the rest of her caseload, has a backlog of child abuse files of 301," Carson said. "And that involves a number of child victims that approaches the number of 340 [or] 345."
Crown attorneys in Manitoba have been in negotiations with the province since their contract expired in March. But Carson denied that her association's grievance is meant to be a bargaining tactic.
"It's simply come to the point where Crown attorneys cannot cope anymore," she said. "The file loads are so high — and the burnout level is high and the stress levels are high — that something needs to be done on an urgent basis to address the concerns."
A spokesperson for Justice Minister Dave Chomiak said the minister cannot comment on the grievance while negotiations are on.
Gerry Irving, the lead negotiator for the province in the contract talks, said it will continue talks with the prosecutors but will not negotiate in public. There is no deadline for those talks, he said.
Irving also disputed the claim that prosecutors' heavy workloads are compromising pubic safety.
"I don't believe it's a public safety issue. There are workload issues," Irving said.
Keep in mind, we simply received this grievance this morning as well. The normal process would be [that] they would file a grievance, we would have a discussion, and the process would unfold. That didn't happen today."
Carson said Manitoba has lost two dozen Crown attorneys over the past couple of years, adding that the province must stop the exodus and hire new prosecutors to shoulder the workload.
Conservative Leader Hugh McFadyen said the province should offer the Crown attorneys more money in order to stay competitive with other provinces.
"It's a matter of priorities, he said. "If they can afford to waste $60 million on forced unionization agreement on the [Red River] Floodway [expansion] then they can afford to put millions of dollars into dealing with child abuse cases in our justice system."
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Manitoba Provincial Crown Prosecutors










Regina. versus Willingham, 2004 CanLII 21552 (MB P.C.)
Date: 2004-02-20 Citation: (2004), 185 Man. R. (2d) 201URL: http://www.canlii.org/en/mb/mbpc/doc/2004/2004canlii21552/

2004canlii21552.html

IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF MANITOBA

BETWEEN Her Majesty the Queen, Ms Raegan Rankin for the Crown

- and -

Shaun David Willingham, Mr. Evan Roitenberg and Mr. Grant Stefanson for the Accused

Reasons for Decision delivered on the 20th day of February, 2004, at the City of Winnipeg in the Province of Manitoba. SUSAN DEVINE, Provincial Judge

Issue:

[1] By motion heard December 1, 2003, Shaun Willingham seeks from this court a declaration that his rights under sections 7 and 11 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms have been violated. As a result of the abuse of process and unreasonable delay that he alleges to have occurred, he seeks the remedy of an order pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter judicially staying proceedings on the pending charges.

The Charges and a Brief Chronology:

On May 30th, 2001, Mr. Willingham was released by a police officer on a promise to appear with an undertaking to make his first court appearance on July 25, 2001 in Winnipeg. This release was in relation to charges laid on July 23, 2001, pursuant to sections 130(a) and 342.1 of the Criminal Code. They alleged that between May 15th and 19th of 2001, Mr. Willingham falsely represented himself to be a named peace officer in certain telephone conversations with Winnipeg Police personnel and thereby fraudulently accessed the computer services of the Canadian Police Information Centre (CPIC) computer system.

[3] A trial that had been scheduled for May 1st and 2nd 2003, was begun but ultimately ended in a mistrial. New trial dates were set for December 1st and 2nd 2003, some 30 months after proceedings were initially commenced.

[4] The trial did not begin on December 1st, as counsel had made no arrangements to have this delay motion heard in advance of the trial date. With the passage of the first day consumed by counsels’ arguments, it was evident that regardless of my decision, we would still not have had the two days needed to hear the evidence. Proceedings were therefore adjourned to April 13 and 14, 2004, the earliest consecutive days available to hear the evidence should this motion fail and the trial proceed.

The Evidence on the Motion:

[5] Defence filed affidavits of Mr. Willingham and of Mr. Stefanson, co-counsel. Transcripts of earlier court proceedings were appended to Mr. Willingham’s affidavit as exhibits. Defence also called one witness, Michel Foubert.

[6] Crown filed one affidavit, that of Brian Wilford who was the Crown who had carriage of the matter at the time of the original trial date.

[7] There was no cross-examination on any of the affidavits filed.

The Events of May 1st , 2003

[8] At the outset of the trial before my colleague, Lismer P.J., defence counsel Evan Roitenberg sought an adjournment of the trial in order to prepare for the voir dire that would now be required for comments made by his client at the time of his arrest. Crown counsel, Brian Wilford, had notified Mr. Roitenberg just one hour before the trial was to start that morning that he had changed his mind and would now be seeking to tender Mr. Willingham’s comments in evidence. Mr. Roitenberg said that he had not prepared to deal with a voir dire that might entail a Feeney issue (see Regina versus Feeney 1997) CanLII 342 (S.C.C.), [1997] 2 S.C R. 13) being raised by defence. At the pre-trial conference the previous November, the Crown had expressly indicated that these comments would not be introduced into evidence.

[9] Rather than granting the adjournment, Judge Lismer accepted the suggestion of the Crown that 4 of his 5 civilian witnesses could testify that day. The voir dire could take place the following afternoon, thus giving Mr. Roitenberg the evening to prepare. Mr. Roitenberg was then given a brief adjournment to seek instructions from his client and to ascertain if this new information would impact on his cross-examination of the civilian witnesses.

10] When court resumed the Crown called its first witness, Michel Foubert. Mr. Foubert recounted a discussion that he had had with Mr. Willingham, his neighbour in his apartment block, about running the license plate numbers of certain cars to assist in identifying the person who had stolen Mr. Foubert’s bike. At that point in the testimony, the Crown showed Mr. Foubert three documents with handwriting on them that referenced certain license plate numbers. The witness identified the documents as items that had been given to him by Mr. Willingham. Defence counsel then objected, stating that he had never seen the documents that the witness was identifying.

[11] Crown counsel confirmed that the police had provided him with the envelope containing the documents only that morning, just before court, and that he had forgotten to advise defence about the documents or to show them to him. Crown then offered not to make use of the documents.

[12] After a brief recess to review the documents, the witness was excused. Defence asked for a mistrial and for the matter to be adjourned, on the basis that the information in the documents would be helpful to the defence and that he would like an opportunity to pursue it. He said that the license plate numbers in these documents were not in fact the same numbers that the Crown particulars had identified as the numbers run by Mr. Willingham for his neighbour.

[13] In the course of the dispute between counsel about the relevance of Mr. Foubert’s pieces of paper, Crown also made reference to certain "call histories" taken by two Crown witnesses from "CPIC" and "Tele-coms." Defence indicated that he had not been provided with those documents either. Crown indicated that it appeared that inadvertently the particular documents had not been sent out to defence with the rest of the disclosure.

[14] Judge Lismer put the matter over to the following day to allow counsel to consider this new evidence that had not been previously disclosed and to ascertain potential continuation dates in the event that he did not declare a mistrial but adjourned the matter instead. He then called the witness back into the courtroom, telling him that a matter had arisen that required further preparation and excusing him until the next day, saying:

…and in the meantime, I have to give you the usual caution, as you are a witness of the court, do not discuss this evidence with anyone or permit anyone to discuss it with you in the meantime.

The Events of May 2, 2003:

[15] The following day a new Crown counsel, Mr. Bellay, appeared for the Crown and told the Court that Mr. Wilford was too ill to attend court that morning. Mr. Bellay advised the Court that he was therefore seeking an adjournment to set a continuation date and that the witness, Mr. Foubert, had already been told that he need not attend.

[16] Judge Lismer said that he had just noticed in looking at the charge that it appeared that no plea had been entered. If so, the proceedings to that juncture would seem to have been a nullity. Crown suggested that since the matter would have to be adjourned in any event, the transcript of proceedings on the day the trial date was set should be consulted to determine the issue.

[17] Mr. Roitenberg asked the Court to reserve on the issue of the mistrial because he also wished to bring a motion for a judicial stay of proceeedings on the issue of Mr. Wilford speaking to the witness after court had adjourned the previous day, contrary to the order of the Court. He said that he had phoned Mr. Wilford at his home that morning to advise him of his intention to make the motion, and to ask the Court to examine Mr. Foubert on the point. Mr. Wilford had then told him that he had already excused Mr. Foubert from attending court.

[18] The matter was then adjourned to May 14th to investigate the issue of the plea and to consider continuation dates before Judge Lismer on the outstanding issues.

[19] On May 22nd, a continuation date was set for December 22nd and 23rd. At Mr. Roitenberg’s request, the trial date was then able to be moved ahead slightly to December 1st and 2nd. At an appearance before that new trial date of December 1st, Judge Lismer concluded that he had been without jurisdiction for the earlier proceedings and that he must therefore declare a mistrial, absent defence consent to the evidence already heard being applied to the trial. Such consent was not given.

The law on Section 7, Abuse of Process and Crown Conduct:

[20] Even before the advent of the Charter, at common law a trial judge was acknowledged to have the discretion to stay proceedings to prevent the abuse of the court’s process through frivolous or vexatious proceedings, for example. In Regina versus Keyowski 1988 CanLII 74 (S.C.C.), [1988] 1 S.C.R. 657 the Supreme Court had to consider whether such a common law remedy would be available to a trial judge to prevent a retrial if no prosecutorial misconduct had been demonstrated. Wilson J. concluded for the court that a series of trials could per se constitute an abuse of process:….

Prosecutorial conduct and improper motivation are but two of many factors to be taken into account when a court is called upon to consider whether or not in a particular case the Crown’s exercise of its discretion to re-lay the indictment amounts to an abuse of process. (paragraph 3)

[21] In Regina versus O’Connor (1995) CanLII 51 (S.C.C.), [1995] 4 S.C.R. 411 the Supreme Court was dealing with the impact of non-disclosure by the Crown and the issue of third party records. In the course of her decision, Justice L’Heureux-Dube commented that the common law doctrine of abuse of process was for the most part subsumed by section 7 of the Charter. She also noted that generally a specific Charter right such as the section 7 protection of a fair trial, or the section 11(b) protection of a timely one, would be engaged but went on to say:

In addition, there is a residual category of conduct caught by section 7 of the Charter. This residual category does not relate to conduct affecting the fairness of the trial or impairing other procedural rights enumerated in the Charter, but instead addresses the panoply of diverse and sometimes unforeseeable circumstances in which a prosecution is conducted in such a manner as to connote unfairness or vexatiousness of such a degree that it contravenes fundamental notions of justice and thus undermines the integrity of the judicial process. (paragraph 73)

[22] The most recent Supreme Court of Canada decision involving a discussion of the remedy of a stay of proceedings for a breach of section 7 Charter rights is that of Regina versus Taillefer; Regina versus Duguay (2003) S.C.J. No. 75. In that decision released December 12, 2003, Lebel J. for the court considered the significance of a Crown failure to make certain disclosure in a first degree murder case. In determining the appropriate remedy, he affirmed some of the earlier jurisprudence of the court in cases such as Regina versus O’Connor (above), Regina versus Carosella (1997) CanLII 402 (S.C.C.), [1997] 1 S.C.R.80 and Regina versus Regan (2002) SCC 12 (CanLII), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 297. Due to what he termed the draconian nature of a stay of proceedings, he said that it is clear that it is to be used as a remedy only as a “last resort”, if there are no other means of affording an accused the right to make full answer and defence.

[23] On the specific issue of whether it should be used by a court as a remedy in those instances where it is the Crown conduct itself or its impact on proceedings that has caused the violation of these rights he stated:

….Although in very rare circumstances, the conduct of the prosecution may be so serious that a stay of proceedings is required in order to avoid bringing our system of justice into disrepute, it is not the purpose of this remedy to punish blameworthy conduct on the part of the state. The remedy is primarily meant to prevent an abuse from being perpetuated or aggravated. (paragraph 119)

[24] Presumably the earlier case cited to me on this point by defence would amount to one such occasion. This is the decision in Regina versus Greganti (2000) O.J. No. 34 (Ontario Superior Court) where a stay of proceedings was granted based on Crown conduct in a prosecution of very serious drug charges. Between August 26 and September 9, 1999, the latter being one day after the three week trial was to have commenced, some 3,500 additional pages of disclosure were provided to defence. This was 12 months after the preliminary had concluded and 28 months after the charges had been laid. These particulars included 1,500 pages of source debriefing notes, 2,000 pages of continuation notes in relation to wiretap applications, 154 pages of police notes, a 24-page surveillance report and 15 negative certificates of analysis. Justice Stayshyn considered the factors set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in its many pronouncements on the issue and concluded that the egregious bad faith behaviour of the Crown and police in this prosecution was deliberate. Accordingly the continuation of the prosecution of even such serious drug charges would shock the community sense of fairness and decency. He stayed the charges.

The conduct of Crown counsel in this case:

[25] Defence complains of the actions of Crown counsel in speaking to his witness outside the courtroom immediately after this witness, in the presence of the accused, had been told by the trial judge not to discuss his evidence with anyone.

[26] Chapter 9 of The Law Society of Manitoba’s Code of Professional Conduct is styled “The Lawyer as Advocate.” Section 16, in wording similar to such provisions in other Canadian jurisdictions, sets out the general professional standard expected of counsel in dealing with witnesses:

When in court the lawyer should observe local rules and practices concerning communication with a witness about the witness’s evidence or any issue in the proceeding. Generally it is considered improper for counsel who called a witness to communicate with that witness without leave of the court while such witness is under cross-examination.

[27] A footnote to section 16 cites the “Commentary” to the same rule in the Ontario Code that gives more specific guidance for counsel about appropriate guidelines in communicating with witnesses who are in the course of giving their evidence. The subsection dealing with situations such as that in the case at bar says:

(a) During examination-in-chief: it is not improper for the examining lawyer to discuss with the witness any matter that has not been covered in the examination up to that point.

[28] Interestingly, this is unlike the situation in England and Wales where barristers are prohibited from any such communication with a witness who has commenced testimony until the conclusion of their evidence, unless the opposing counsel or the Court have expressly consented. (see Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, 7th edition, section 705).

[29] In the ordinary course then, it would seem that there would be nothing improper about Mr. Wilford speaking with his witness about the prospective evidence of the witness. Here however the situation was much less clear-cut.

[30] The witness had already been asked on the stand about the information that he claimed had been provided to him by the accused. Mr. Wilford had then put to him the three documents for identification just before the defence objection was made. Arguably then this was an area in which the Crown had to tread carefully since the witness was in the course of giving his testimony in relation to such information. More importantly however, the judge in adjourning the matter had apparently given a blanket admonition to the witness not to discuss his or her evidence with anyone.

[31] Therefore it would have been vastly preferable for Mr. Wilford to have asked the judge for clarification on whether the judge had in fact intended to prevent him speaking further to his witness or to impose any limitations on his doing so.

[2] This would have made the situation much more straightforward and comprehensible not just for counsel, but even more importantly for both the witness and the accused. Defence correctly points out that either or both of them might have thought that the Crown’s actions in approaching the witness outside of the courtroom were inconsistent with the order that they had just heard the judge make. Such a perception on their part would not be in the service of the administration of justice overall.

[33] However, in the circumstances before me, I cannot conclude that Mr. Wilford intended by his actions to disobey the order of the Court. According to his affidavit, it was his view, based on the past law and practise in this jurisdiction, that he was free to continue to speak to his witness despite the judge’s comment. As noted above, he should not necessarily have made this assumption on this occasion, having regard to the explicit wording of the judge’s order. Even more significantly, he should not have cavalierly dismissed the concerns of defence counsel once this matter was brought to his attention. Even if he thought defence counsel was wrong, the more prudent course of action would have been to then seek clarification from the judge, something that it might have been possible to do immediately since court had just adjourned.

[34] Although Mr. Wilford’s conduct may inadvertently have been conduct that could have tended to “bring the administration of justice into disrepute” in the eyes of the witness, and/or the accused, I cannot conclude, in light of the case law cited above, that this conduct rises to a level that warrants a stay of proceedings as a necessary or appropriate remedy. An explanation to the accused and to the witness once court resumed about counsels’ disagreement as to the meaning of the judge’s order would likely have been sufficient to rectify the situation in this case. Crown counsel’s conduct did not in actuality compromise Mr. Willingham’s ability to have a fair trial nor should it have created such a perception in a reasonably informed member of the public.

[35] The wording of my colleague’s order did not differ appreciably from similar orders that I have routinely made, in similar circumstances of adjourning the ongoing testimony of a witness. It is impossible to know whether or not on this occasion Judge Lismer had explicitly turned his mind to the issue of what, if any, contact either Crown or defence were intended to have to the witness overnight and whether or not he intended his order to impose any limits on such contact. However, as I have noted above, in the event that any such order raises any question in the mind of either or both counsel, prudence dictates that they should seek clarification from the judge before potentially acting in breach of such an order.

The Law on Section 11 and Unreasonable Delay:

[36] The leading case on the issue of unreasonable delay continues to be the decision of the Supreme Court in Regina versus Morin (1992) CanLII 89 (S.C.C.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771. The Supreme Court had the opportunity in Morin to refine the determinations they had earlier made in Regina versus Askov (1990) CanLII 45 (S.C.C.), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199 as to the meaning of the Charter guarantee of the right to trial within a reasonable time. Ms. Morin had been released on an appearance notice on January 9, 1988 for a first appearance date of February 23rd at which time she set what was described as the earliest trial date available to her of March 28, 1989. Her motion for unreasonable delay at her trial was dismissed and she was convicted, a decision that was ultimately upheld by the Supreme Court in dismissing her appeal.

[37] In doing so, the Court affirmed that the trial judge in considering an application for a stay must balance the individual’s interest in a fair and prompt adjudication of her charges with the societal interest in ensuring that those who transgress the law are dealt with according to law. Sopinka J. delineated the factors that must be considered in any such application. They included the length of the delay, any waiver of time periods, the reasons for the delay, including inherent time requirements of the case, the actions of the accused, the actions of the Crown, any limits on institutional resources and any other reasons for delay. Prejudice to the accused was also a factor that had to be considered.

[38] According to Sopinka J., the relevant time period for scrutiny is the time elapsed from the date of the charge to the end of the trial. He recognized that there are inherent paperwork and administrative requirements that are inevitable in every case. He therefore concluded that the period of institutional delay that should be considered by the Court is the period that starts when the parties are ready for trial and the system cannot accommodate them. A guideline for evaluating the reasonableness of such institutional delay would be a period of some 8 to 10 months. In Ms. Morin's case, even though this period had amounted to some 12 or 13 months, the Court held that the period was not unreasonable, particularly in the absence of any evidence showing prejudice to the accused.

[39] A number of other cases were cited to me by both defence and Crown but not surprisingly these cases tend to primarily turn on their individual facts. Defence cites for example Regina versus Sheikhi (2001) M.J. No. 523(Man. P.C.) in which my colleague Joyal P.J. granted a motion for unreasonable delay in a situation where an accused charged July 30, 1999, on a charge of refusal to provide breath samples was not being brought to trial until July 6, 2001. Similarly in Regina versus St. Germain (2000) M.J. No. 621(Man. P.C.), another colleague, Chartier, P.J. also granted relief on a delay motion in respect of a summary assault cause bodily harm and forcible confinement that took 37 ½ months to get to trial. Defence also relied on the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Regina versus Padfield (1992) O.J. No 2813 (Ontario Court of Appeal).

[40] In turn, Crown provided me with several instances of Manitoba cases at all court levels, in which unreasonable delay motions were unsuccessful. For example in Regina versus Amato, (2002) M.J.No.143, my colleague Pullan, P.J., declined to grant relief for a 16 ½ month delay on two Highway Traffic Act charges. Similarly in Regina versus Higgins (2001) M.J.No. 98 (Man. Q.B.), a motion for a finding of unreasonable delay regarding the 32 month period from charge to trial on driving and alcohol charges stemming from a fatal auto accident was denied, balancing considerations of waiver and prejudice in particular. The Manitoba Court of Appeal in Regina versus Loewen (1998) M.J.No. 553 upheld a decision that a 33-month delay on money laundering charges did not constitute unreasonable delay, balancing the necessary factors. Three other examples cited by the Crown that I have also reviewed include the decisions in Regina versus Stewart (2000) B.C.J. No. 1333 (B.C.C.A.), Regina versus Kovacs-Tatar (2003) O.J. No. 2809 (Ontario Superior Court) and Regina versus Sharma (1992) CanLII 90 (S.C.C.), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 814, the latter being a case heard with Morin. A delay of 13 months between arrest and trial may have amounted to a prima facie case for excessive delay in that instance but the prejudice that the accused had demonstrated did not outweigh society’s interests in bringing him to trial.

[41] A more recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal explicitly deals with the issue of the respective responsibilities of all of the various players in the system - Defence, Crown, and Judge - to be alive to the issue of delay. The Court in Regina versus R.M. (2003) O.J. No. 4240 (Ontario of Appeal) to a 61 ½ month delay from the laying of the aggravated assault and sexual assault charges to their trial date. MacPherson J. for the court articulated this responsibility not only to monitor the progress of cases through the system but also to proactively acknowledge on the record those cases where the issue of unreasonable delay is clearly looming and how counsel propose to deal with the issue. Commenting on a preliminary inquiry that was adjourned twice and took 16 months to complete he said:

If an adjournment of a preliminary inquiry is required, there should not be a pro forma 'what is the next available date' conversation. Instead the time period that has already elapsed should be explicitly acknowledged on the record and there should be a frank discussion about how to solve the problem. The focus of the discussion should be on ways to speed up the proceeding…

[42] In the course of his decision Justice MacPherson had also referred with approval to an earlier decision of the court in which a seven-month delay in scheduling the continuation of a preliminary inquiry was found to be too long. (Regina v. Satkunananthan 2001) CanLII 24061 (ON C.A.), (2001) 152 C.C.C. (3d) 321).

[43] It would seem that these acknowledged responsibilities of all of the system participants with regard to the timeliness of cases going forward should apply equally to matters in which the Crown has proceeded by way of summary conviction.

The Length of the Delay in this case:

[44] As of the date of this motion on December 1st, 2003, a total of some 30 months had elapsed from Mr. Willingham’s release on May 30, 2001 on these charges. Prima facie this appears to be an excessive amount of time for relatively straightforward summary charges, the investigation of which seemingly concluded long before Mr. Willingham’s first appearance. The delay is certainly of a length that necessitates an examination of its reasonableness, having regard to the factors delineated in Morin. (above)

The Reasons for the Delay and any Waiver of Time Periods:

a) Prior to March 4, 2002:

[45] As noted above in Morin, due to the inherent paperwork and administrative time requirements for all cases, the significant time period to be considered in delay applications is the period from when counsel are ready to set a date until the trial date itself. The transcript shows that the parties were initially ready to set a date on March 4, 2002.

[46] This date was Mr. Willingham’s 9th court appearance and was coincidentally 9 months after the commencement of the proceedings. While not an exemplary pace for summary matters, the transcripts indicate that the adjournments in question were to obtain counsel, and then co-counsel, and to obtain particulars, and more particulars, before entering a plea. Most, if not all, adjournments appear to have been by consent with neither counsel pressing the other for speedier disclosure or for a plea to be entered. Therefore I am prepared to consider the 9 months to be neutral or at least not to attribute it to either the Crown or defence side of the ledger. b) March 4, 2002 to setting of the trial date on July 31, 2002:

[47] The trial date was not actually set until 5 months after counsel had first indicated on March 4th that they wished to set a date. In this jurisdiction both Crown and defence counsel tend to want to adjourn the bulk of their matters to their own “screening courts” that are typically scheduled every 4 to 6 weeks. The 5 month delay from March 4th 2002 to July 31st 2002 thus encompassed only 4 remands, two of which were due to the Crown’s failure to have appropriate dates available in court and two to defence counsel’s requests to put the matter over for other dates to be obtained. I have concluded therefore that half of this time is attributable to the actions of the Crown and half to the actions of defence who can thus be considered to have waived this 2 ½ months of additional delay. c) July 31, 2002 to May 1st, 2003:

[48] This 9 month period is the elapsed time from the setting of the trial date to the trial date itself. It falls within the reasonable time frame of 8 to 10 months enunciated in Morin and is attributable to institutional resource limitations. d) May 1, 2003 to December 1, 2003:

[49] This 7 month period from the first trial date to the second is time that is wholly attributable to the actions of the Crown in failing to provide proper disclosure and the ensuing ramifications thereof. Originally the earliest new dates that could be found were December 22nd and 23rd but defence made efforts to find an earlier date and was able to advance the trial date by 3 weeks.

The disclosure issue:

[50] Although the issue of disclosure is pertinent here only insofar as it is an explanation for the delay, it is nonetheless an issue that even in this limited context bears some further comment. The allegation before the Court, as I understand it to be, is that Mr. Willingham misrepresented himself as a peace officer in certain telephone calls to operators who controlled access to the both the local police information system and CPIC, the national system. By doing so, he obtained information on his neighbour’s behalf as to the identity of the registered owners of a certain vehicle or vehicles.

[51] As noted earlier, the documents that were only produced by the police to the Crown on the first day of the first trial were handwritten pieces of paper containing various license numbers. The neighbour in question had apparently given the police these documents on the date of their initial meeting with him, before any charges were even laid. According to defence counsel, these license numbers were not the same license numbers as those contained in the police particulars provided to defence. I have gone into the nature of this disclosure in some detail because it seems to me to be information that the defence could not reasonably be expected to have known to exist, unlike other more predictable information available in the case of more pedestrian charges. If defence could not have anticipated the existence of these documents, they could not be expected to have pursued their production. Since the police did not produce these documents to the Crown until the date of the trial, the fault insofar as these handwritten documents are concerned lies clearly at the feet of the police. However as Justice Straychysn noted in Greganti (above) on the issue of disclosure:

It is clear however that the sins of the police are the sins of the prosecution (paragraph 162)

[52] This issue of disclosure as between police and Crown is a troublesome one and warrants further comment. Even on the basis of my own personal experience as a judge, the situation that arose in this case is far from unusual. Crown are frequently advising in docket courts that despite repeated requests, they are waiting for certain information to be provided to them by the police – be it videotaped statements, surveillance videos or police notes. Matters are being adjourned again and again, clogging up court dockets, and contributing to court backlogs, and the entering of pleas by accused persons is being delayed, all because such disclosure is outstanding. As the Supreme Court made clear in Regina versus Stinchcombe,1991 CanLII 45 (S.C.C.), [1991] 3 S.C.R 326, an accused is entitled to have disclosure of all relevant information that could reasonably be used in meeting the case against him before being called upon to enter a plea.

[53] Even when disclosure is ostensibly complete, as was the case here, the police, with some regularity, bring new evidence to the trial Crown on the morning of the hearing, often resulting in adjournments of the trials and further delays. In this regard I note that at least two of the other decisions from my jurisdiction cited to me on the issue of unreasonable day refer to disclosure problems that were at the root of Crown or defence requests for adjournments on the date of trial (see (Sheikhi and St. Germain above). Whether the uncovering of the existence of newly “found” materials on the date of trial is as a result of the police misunderstanding of their duties with regard to disclosure or of the Crown’s failure to make the appropriate requests of them is immaterial. The financial cost to the system in terms of wasted court time and the personal costs in terms of inconvenience to witnesses make this a significant ongoing problem whatever its cause.

[54] The other item of disclosure that had not been provided to defence until the trial date was the call histories or computer generated documents produced by the police operators on their computers. These purportedly contained transcripts, or at least more comprehensive information about the content, of the phone calls allegedly made by the accused that constituted the offence. Crown counsel explained to Judge Lismer that it was through inadvertence that these documents had not been provided to defence in advance of the trial. The jurisprudence on this issue understandably puts an onus on defence to pursue disclosure and not to merely be the passive recipient of same. Nonetheless, the Crown had apparently represented to defence before the trial date was even set that disclosure was complete and defence was entitled to rely on that representation.

[55] In this instance both the failure of the police to provide timely disclosure to the Crown, and the failure of the Crown to provide comprehensive disclosure to defence, caused the 7 month delay between the first and second trial date and is the reason that such period of delay can be laid at the feet of the Crown.

Summary of the Reasons for the Delay:

[56] For the reasons noted above, the 30 months of delay overall is of sufficient length to trigger an examination of its reasonableness. A maximum of 9 months of the delay could be attributed to institutional resource limitations at the time the date was ready to be set. The initial 9 months was a neutral factor, being attributable to both inherent time requirements and the relatively leisurely pace set by both Crown and defence in concluding same.

[57] Had a trial date 9 months hence been set at the time counsel were first ready to set the date, the trial would have occurred 18 months from the date of issuance of process. While not exceptionally fast for a summary matter, nonetheless the delay would not likely have been characterized as unreasonable at that time on these facts.

[58] However, the additional 12 months delay here is represented by the 5 month delay between attempting to set the trial date and actually setting it, and the 7 month period between the first and second trial date. With the Crown responsible for half of the 5 month period and the entirety of the second period, the majority of the delay, some 9.5 months, or approximately 1/3 of the overall 30 month delay, is attributable to the Crown.

[59] In the result, Mr. Willingham has satisfied me that there has been an unreasonable delay in bringing his matter to trial. Whether the delay is such as to warrant the remedy sought necessitates further consideration.

Prejudice to the accused:

[60] Morin (above) and subsequent cases suggest that the Court is not entitled to place much weight on the “ordinary” prejudice to any individual that results merely from having charges pending against one. Terms of judicial interim release are one factor to be considered by the court. In this instance, the undertaking on which Mr. Willingham was released prohibited him only from communication with a particular named individual and there was some suggestion by counsel that this provision was varied at some point. An examination of the record of court proceedings does not show whether this did occur. Whether or not this condition was lifted or deleted at some juncture, these terms of bail cannot be termed any kind of stringent limitation on liberty as would be the case with reporting conditions or curfews or the like.

[61] Mr. Willingham has however stated in his affidavit that he has experienced significant stress as a result of the two and a half year expanse of time during which the proceedings have been outstanding, and that he does fear that his memory, and that of his witnesses, will be compromised by the passage of time. However, perhaps more significantly, Mr. Willingham has also attested that he completed paramedic training during this period that the charges have been pending. Any prospective employers require a declaration from him that he does not have any convictions nor any charges outstanding. He has thus been unable to engage in his chosen employment over the 30-month period and in addition, the issue of his ability to participate in this career in future also remains unsettled, causing additional stress to him.

The Appropriateness of a Remedy:

[62] Weighing all of these factors, Mr. Willingham has satisfied me that there has been a breach of his section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

[63] As was noted above, the task for a Court on an unreasonable delay motion necessitates a balancing of the public interest in having criminal charges adjudicated with the prejudice to the accused in continuing with their prosecution. The facts of a particular case have some bearing in the equation as more serious charges may generate a stronger societal interest in bringing the matter to trial. In this instance, Mr. Willingham faced summary conviction charges that were not unduly complex and should seemingly have been able to be resolved in an expeditious manner. The facts underlying the incident that have emerged in the course of considering this motion suggest that the context of any offences that may have occurred here was that of a doing a favour for a neighbour.

[64] Very little of the responsibility for the 30 month delay can be laid at Mr. Willingham’s door. He has satisfied me that the overall lengthy delay in this instance did cause actual prejudice to his security interest in terms of his employability, in addition to the usual prejudice from having charges pending.

[65] The non-disclosure by the Crown was responsible for the adjournment of the trial on the trial date and incidentally occurred in the context of last minute changes in the Crown position on the evidence it would adduce against him. By adding to the overall delay, it also exacerbated what was initially the more tolerable 9 month delay from plea to trial attributable to institutional resource limitations.

[66] On the facts before me and weighing all the variables noted above, I conclude that in this instance it is in the overall interests of the administration of justice to grant a remedy to Mr. Willingham and to stay proceedings against him pursuant to section 24(1) of the Charter.

Original signed by:_______________________Susan Devine, P.J.

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